INEOS Mistakes
When Sir Jim Ratcliffe and INEOS arrived at Manchester United in February 2024, there was a genuine feeling that things might finally be about to change.
After more than a decade of questionable decisions, poor recruitment, managerial instability and a seemingly endless disconnect between the club and its supporters under the Glazer family, the arrival of a new footballing structure was welcomed by many.
There was hope. There was optimism. There was a belief that Manchester United were finally going to be run like a modern football club again.
INEOS promised to bring expertise, accountability and a clear footballing vision. The days of making decisions based on commercial interests, appointing people without the necessary experience and allowing the club to drift were supposedly over.
Yet, as we look at the period since their arrival, it is becoming increasingly difficult to distinguish the INEOS era from the Glazer era that preceded it.
Of course, rebuilding Manchester United was never going to be straightforward. The problems inherited were enormous, and nobody realistically expected everything to be fixed overnight. However, there is a difference between making difficult decisions as part of a long-term rebuild and repeatedly making avoidable mistakes that leave the club looking just as directionless as before.
Here are five of the biggest mistakes made by INEOS since taking control of football operations at Manchester United.
Hiring Managers
One of the biggest criticisms of the Glazer era was the club’s inability to identify and appoint the right manager post-Ferguson. Rather than establishing a clear footballing philosophy and finding a manager who could deliver it, United often appeared to react to circumstances, changing direction whenever results or public opinion demanded it.
Unfortunately, INEOS have shown remarkably similar tendencies.
The Erik ten Hag situation was perhaps the first major indication that the new ownership might not be quite as organised as supporters had hoped.
Following the 2023/24 season, United conducted a review of Ten Hag’s position. Despite considering alternatives, they ultimately decided to retain the Dutchman following the FA Cup final victory over Manchester City.
That decision was not necessarily wrong. Winning a major trophy against your biggest rivals is a significant achievement, and there was an argument for giving Ten Hag another opportunity.
However, what followed was difficult to understand.
INEOS brought in a new senior leadership team, including Omar Berrada and Dan Ashworth, while also making significant changes to the footballing structure. Ten Hag was publicly backed, given another transfer window and allowed to continue building his squad.
Yet just 13 league games into the new season, he was dismissed.
The obvious question is why the club had not made that decision during the summer if they genuinely believed he was no longer the right man.
United had an opportunity to make a clean break, identify their preferred successor and begin a new project with a manager who fitted their supposed long-term vision. Instead, they spent another summer investing in a manager they would shortly decide was unsuitable.
Then came Ruben Amorim.
Amorim was an exciting appointment, highly regarded for his work at Sporting CP and viewed as one of Europe’s most promising young coaches. However, his appointment raised another important question: had Manchester United actually built a squad capable of playing the football he wanted?
His preference for a 3-4-3 system was well established. This was not a surprise that emerged after his arrival. It was fundamental to his managerial identity.
Yet United were still attempting to reshape a squad that had been assembled under several different managers, with players recruited for contrasting tactical approaches.
The result was another period of transition, followed by another breakdown in the relationship between the head coach and the club’s hierarchy.
Amorim’s departure in January 2026 only reinforced the feeling that INEOS had not established a convincing long-term plan.
The issue is not that Manchester United have appointed managers who subsequently failed. Football is unpredictable, and even the best recruitment processes cannot guarantee success.
The issue is that INEOS have repeatedly appeared uncertain about what they actually want from their head coach.
Do they want a manager with significant control over recruitment? Do they want a head coach who simply works within a system designed by the sporting department? Or do they want a collaborative structure where everybody understands their responsibilities?
There is nothing inherently wrong with any of those approaches. But the club needs to decide which one it wants and recruit accordingly.
At present, the managerial appointments have looked far too reactive for an ownership group that promised to bring stability and forward planning.
Firing Managers
If the recruitment of managers has been questionable, the handling of their departures has been equally concerning.
Manchester United have become experts at creating managerial uncertainty, and INEOS have done little to suggest that the cycle is about to end.
Ten Hag’s departure was an example of poor timing and questionable planning. Having decided to retain him, the club then invested further resources into his squad before changing its mind just a few months later.
Then there was the appointment and subsequent dismissal of Amorim.
There will always be circumstances where a manager has to leave. Sometimes relationships break down, results become unacceptable or the club simply reaches the conclusion that a different direction is required.
But a well-run football club should have a succession plan. It should know what it wants next, have clear lines of communication and avoid allowing situations to become public spectacles.
United’s handling of managerial changes has too often felt like a reaction to the latest crisis rather than the execution of a carefully considered strategy.
And there is a financial consequence to all of this.
Manchester United have spent significant sums on compensation, recruitment processes and managerial changes. The appointment of Amorim, for example, involved paying Sporting to secure his services before the end of his existing arrangement.
It is particularly difficult to watch when the same ownership group has been so vocal about the need to reduce expenditure elsewhere.
Supporters are told that the club must be more financially responsible, that costs need to be reduced and that difficult decisions are unavoidable.
Yet the people making the biggest footballing decisions seem capable of making expensive mistakes of their own.
There is also the damage caused to the playing squad.
Every new manager brings different ideas, different tactical demands and different opinions about which players are suitable. Players recruited for one system can suddenly become surplus to requirements under another.
That creates an expensive and frustrating cycle of recruitment and rebuilding.
The manager gets blamed, the manager goes, another manager arrives, and the process begins again.
Sound familiar?
It should. It is precisely the kind of instability supporters hoped INEOS would eliminate.
Staff
Perhaps the most concerning aspect of the INEOS takeover has been the apparent disconnect between the promises of professionalising Manchester United and the way the club’s staffing structure has been handled.
There are two sides to this problem: the senior football appointments and the treatment of everyday club employees.
Let’s start at the top.
The appointment of Dan Ashworth as sporting director was supposed to represent a major step forward. He was regarded as one of the most respected sporting directors in English football, and United went to considerable lengths to secure his services from Newcastle United.
There was a lengthy process, compensation had to be negotiated and supporters were told that his expertise would help transform the club’s recruitment and footballing operations.
Yet after only five months in the position, Ashworth had departed.
Five months.
For a club that had supposedly identified him as a crucial part of its new structure, it was an extraordinary turnaround.
There can be legitimate disagreements behind closed doors, and sometimes senior appointments simply do not work out. However, it raises serious questions about the recruitment process itself.
How thoroughly had United assessed whether Ashworth was the right fit? Had everybody agreed on his responsibilities? Was there a clear understanding of how decisions would be made between the sporting director, chief executive, technical director and ownership?
If those things were not established before his arrival, then the club had failed before he had even started.
The wider footballing structure has also seen considerable changes, with Jason Wilcox becoming an important figure in the sporting department.
Again, there is nothing wrong with changing personnel if the club believes it has made the wrong appointment. But when the supposedly elite structure is constantly changing, it becomes difficult to understand where the consistency and long-term planning are supposed to come from.
Then there is the other side of the staffing issue.
INEOS have overseen significant redundancies, including an initial round of approximately 250 job cuts, with further reductions subsequently announced.
There have also been decisions to remove or reduce staff benefits, including free lunches and arrangements surrounding travel to the FA Cup final.
It is important to acknowledge that Manchester United had financial and operational problems that needed addressing. Nobody is suggesting that every historical expense should be protected indefinitely.
However, the optics have been particularly poor.
Supporters have watched the club spend enormous amounts of money on players, managerial compensation and senior appointments, while ordinary employees have been told that savings need to be made.
These are people who work behind the scenes, often without the recognition received by those on the pitch, and who contribute to the everyday running of Manchester United.
A football club is about more than its first team. It is about its people, its identity and the culture that exists throughout the organisation.
There is a danger that INEOS have become so focused on restructuring the balance sheet that they have lost sight of the importance of the people who make Manchester United what it is.
You cannot promise to rebuild a football club’s culture while simultaneously creating an environment where long-serving employees feel disposable.
And you certainly cannot claim to have established a world-class football operation when the senior structure itself appears to be in a constant state of flux.
Fans
One of the biggest reasons supporters initially welcomed INEOS was the belief that they would be more approachable and communicative than the Glazers.
For years, the Glazer family had been criticised for their lack of engagement with supporters. They were distant owners, rarely seen and seemingly uninterested in building a meaningful relationship with the fanbase.
Ratcliffe, by contrast, was a lifelong Manchester United supporter. He spoke passionately about the club, understood its history and appeared to appreciate what it meant to the people who followed it.
There was an opportunity here to do things differently.
Unfortunately, that opportunity has been squandered in several respects.
The ticketing decisions have been particularly unpopular.
The introduction of a £66 flat-rate ticket price, removing previous concessions for children and senior supporters, was met with considerable criticism. For many ordinary supporters, attending Manchester United matches is already an expensive commitment.
Increasing the financial burden on those people, particularly during a period when performances have been disappointing, was always likely to cause frustration.
Then there have been the broader cost-cutting measures and decisions affecting supporters’ experiences.
The cancellation of previously provided benefits, including free travel arrangements for the 2024 FA Cup final, did little to improve relations.
The problem is not necessarily that every decision was financially unjustifiable. The club has a responsibility to operate sustainably.
But communication matters.
Supporters want to understand why decisions are being made. They want to feel that their opinions are considered and that the people running their football club understand the importance of the relationship between the club and its fanbase.
Instead, there has often been a feeling that decisions are simply announced, implemented and defended afterwards.
That is not how you rebuild trust.
There is also something particularly frustrating about the contrast between the public messaging and the actual experience of supporters.
INEOS arrived promising a new era, a fresh approach and a Manchester United that would once again be something its supporters could be proud of.
Yet many fans now feel that they are being asked to pay more, accept less and simply trust the people in charge.
That is a difficult sell when the footballing side of the operation has not delivered the improvements that were promised.
The Glazers were criticised for treating supporters as customers rather than the lifeblood of the football club.
INEOS should have understood that this was one of the biggest mistakes they needed to avoid.
Instead, they have created their own reasons for supporters to feel increasingly disconnected.
Transfers
Ultimately, everything at Manchester United comes back to what happens on the pitch.
Supporters can tolerate difficult financial decisions, changes to the staffing structure and even the occasional managerial mistake if they can see a convincing plan developing.
But recruitment remains one of the biggest reasons to question the INEOS project.
The promise was straightforward: Manchester United would stop allowing managers to dictate the transfer strategy and would instead establish a professional recruitment department capable of identifying players who fitted a consistent footballing philosophy.
It was exactly what supporters wanted to hear.
For too long, United had appeared to recruit players based on individual managerial preferences, reputation and availability rather than a coherent long-term plan.
Unfortunately, INEOS have not completely escaped those problems.
The summer of 2024 was their first opportunity to demonstrate a new approach. Joshua Zirkzee, Matthijs de Ligt, Noussair Mazraoui, Leny Yoro and Manuel Ugarte arrived in a substantial recruitment drive.
There were positives. Yoro was an exciting young defensive prospect, while Mazraoui offered versatility and De Ligt brought experience.
However, questions remained about the overall balance of the squad and whether the club had addressed its most pressing needs.
More importantly, the subsequent changes in management meant that the recruitment strategy once again had to be reconsidered.
The appointment of Amorim created another challenge.
United needed players capable of operating in his preferred system, and subsequent recruitment increasingly reflected that requirement.
The problem was that this represented another significant tactical commitment at a club that had already spent years changing direction.
Then came the summer of 2025.
United invested heavily in their attacking options, bringing in Matheus Cunha, Bryan Mbeumo and Benjamin Sesko, alongside goalkeeper Senne Lammens.
There was a reasonable argument behind the strategy. United needed more goals, greater attacking quality and players capable of providing a more consistent threat.
However, the midfield situation remained a major concern.
The need for a reliable, mobile and technically capable midfield was hardly a secret. It had been an issue for some time, yet the club continued to devote substantial resources to other areas.
Recruitment cannot simply be about fixing one department at a time while ignoring problems elsewhere.
A football squad needs balance. You cannot build a successful team by accumulating exciting attacking players while leaving fundamental weaknesses unresolved.
There is also the question of whether recruitment should be dictated by a particular manager’s system.
If United are genuinely committed to a long-term footballing identity, they should be identifying players who fit that identity regardless of who happens to be in the dugout.
Instead, the club has risked creating another collection of players whose suitability depends on the tactical preferences of the current head coach.
And what happens when that head coach leaves?
We have seen this movie before.
The other major problem is the club’s ability to move players on.
United have repeatedly struggled to sell unwanted players for reasonable fees, leaving themselves with bloated wage bills and limited flexibility in the transfer market.
Recruitment is not simply about buying players. It is about understanding the market, managing contracts, planning succession and ensuring that the squad evolves in a sustainable way.
There have been some encouraging individual signings under INEOS, and it would be unfair to suggest that every transfer has been a failure.
But the overall picture remains inconsistent.
For an ownership group that promised to bring elite football expertise to Manchester United, the recruitment operation should be much further ahead by now.
Perhaps the biggest disappointment of the INEOS ownership is not that they have made mistakes. Every ownership group, sporting director and football executive makes mistakes.
It is that so many of their mistakes feel remarkably familiar.
The managerial uncertainty, the expensive recruitment decisions, the changing footballing structures, the lack of squad balance and the strained relationship with supporters are all issues that Manchester United fans have been dealing with for years.
The Glazers were criticised for failing to establish a coherent footballing operation. INEOS arrived promising to fix it, yet have already demonstrated many of the same weaknesses.
They have hired people they subsequently moved on from, backed managers before losing confidence in them, overseen significant staff cuts, made unpopular decisions affecting supporters and continued to struggle with a consistent transfer strategy.
And while the club’s financial situation undoubtedly needed attention, it is difficult to ignore the apparent contradiction between cutting costs wherever possible and continuing to make expensive mistakes at the very top.
There is an argument that INEOS inherited a mess and that two years is not enough time to completely transform an institution as large as Manchester United. That is fair, and they deserve some patience.
But patience should not mean immunity from criticism.
The original excitement surrounding Ratcliffe’s arrival was built on the idea that Manchester United would finally be run differently. Supporters were not simply looking for a new face in the boardroom. They wanted a new approach, a clear vision and people who understood how to build a successful football club.
So far, the evidence has been underwhelming.
The uncomfortable truth is that, despite all the talk of restructuring, expertise and a fresh start, Manchester United still look remarkably like the club they were under the Glazers.
The difference is that there are now different people making many of the same mistakes.
INEOS may have replaced some of the faces, changed the organisational chart and introduced a new approach to cutting costs, but the fundamental problems remain.
Manchester United do not need another ownership group promising to restore the club to its former glory. They need an ownership group that can actually demonstrate that it knows how to do it.